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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.     
 As Uber would tell it, when Plaintiffs filed their 
disability-discrimination suit in federal court, they wound 
themselves in a Gordian knot:  They do not have standing to 
sue unless they would agree to Uber’s Terms of Use, but those 
terms would require Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claim instead of 
litigating it in federal court.  Uber urges that the only way to 
untie this knot is for us to reverse the District Court’s ruling 
that Plaintiffs have standing, a decision not generally 
reviewable on interlocutory appeal, as well as its ruling that 
Plaintiffs have no contractual obligation to arbitrate.  Our 
precedent, however, makes this case far less knotty than Uber 
suggests.  We established in Griswold v. Coventry First LLC 
that, on interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration, our appellate jurisdiction is confined to 
review of that order.  762 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2014).  We 
not only have no independent obligation to review 
nonappealable orders—even jurisdictional ones.  We also have 
no power to do so unless we can exercise pendent appellate 




 This case involves new technology, but that makes 
Griswold no less applicable.  We therefore will review only the 
District Court’s arbitrability decision, as we have no obligation 
to review its standing decision, and Uber has not demonstrated 
that pendent appellate jurisdiction over that decision would be 
appropriate.  And because we agree that Plaintiffs—who have 
never accepted Uber’s terms, including its mandatory 
arbitration clause—cannot be equitably estopped from suing in 
court, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Uber’s 
motion to compel arbitration.2   
I. Background  
Plaintiffs are motorized-wheelchair users who live in 
the Pittsburgh area and the nonprofit Pittsburghers for Public 
Transit, whose mission is to make “transportation . . . available 
and accessible to all, including people with limited mobility.”  
A32.  They filed suit in District Court, alleging on behalf of 
themselves, and other similarly situated wheelchair users, that 
the ridesharing company Uber discriminated against 
individuals with mobility disabilities by not offering a 
“wheelchair accessible vehicle” (WAV) option in the 
Pittsburgh area.  As charged in the complaint, this practice 
violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq., which prohibits 
“discriminat[ion] . . . on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
 
2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented 
to proceed before a magistrate judge.  We therefore refer to the 
Magistrate Judge’s rulings as those of the District Court.  See 




advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation,” id. § 12182, and, but for the unavailability of 
WAVs, Plaintiffs would download the Uber app and use its 
ridesharing service.   
Uber filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), see 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4, 
contending that even though Plaintiffs had never registered for 
an Uber account or accepted its Terms of Use, they were 
nevertheless bound by the mandatory arbitration clause of that 
agreement.  See A57 (“By agreeing to the Terms, you agree 
that you are required to resolve any claim that you may have 
against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration.”).  In support 
of its motion, Uber argued specifically that Plaintiffs could not 
establish standing to sue in federal court unless they “step into 
the shoes” of “actual Uber Rider App users who all are bound 
by Uber’s Terms of Use,” A10–11 (citation omitted), and more 
generally that Plaintiffs “necessarily rel[ied] on Uber’s service 
contract to bring suit and should therefore be estopped from 
avoiding [the] obligation[]” to arbitrate, A9.   
The District Court rejected both arguments.  It 
determined that Plaintiffs’ failure to download the Uber app, 
agree to the terms, and perform the “futile gesture” of 
requesting a WAV ride did not prevent them from pleading an 
injury in fact.  A11 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 366–67 (1977)).  More broadly, the 
District Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ disability-
discrimination claim did not rely on, or even embrace, Uber’s 
Terms of Use, but was instead based on the ADA, a federal 
anti-discrimination statute.  The Court thus declined to adopt 
Uber’s “overly-broad interpretation of the law of this Circuit 




non-signatories to arbitration,” A9 n.4, which requires the non-
signatories to have knowingly exploited the agreement for their 
benefit.  See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc 
Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
Accordingly, the District Court denied the motion to 
compel arbitration, and Uber timely filed this interlocutory 
appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction  
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  For our part, “[w]e have appellate jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel 
arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Federal 
Arbitration Act . . . , which provides that ‘[a]n appeal may be 
taken’ from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration.”  
Griswold, 762 F.3d at 268 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B)).   
III. Discussion  
On appeal, Uber primarily urges that we cannot reach 
the merits of the motion to compel arbitration without first 
determining that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their 
underlying ADA claim—pursuant to either our independent 
obligation to ensure we have jurisdiction or our pendent 
appellate jurisdiction.  If Uber does not prevail on the standing 
issue, it maintains that Plaintiffs are nevertheless equitably 
estopped from refusing to arbitrate.  For the following reasons, 
we conclude that we may not reach the standing issue in this 
interlocutory appeal and that Plaintiffs are not bound to 
arbitrate under an agreement they have never accepted or 




A. We Have No Obligation or Authority to Review 
Standing 
We are not persuaded by Uber’s arguments that we 
either must or, in our discretion, should decide whether 
Plaintiffs have standing to sue.  The former argument is 
squarely foreclosed by Griswold, which held that, on 
interlocutory appeal of a motion to compel arbitration, we have 
no independent obligation to assess the plaintiff’s standing to 
sue.  762 F.3d at 269.  The latter argument also falls flat, but 
for a different reason:  Pendent appellate jurisdiction requires 
the nonappealable standing issue to be inextricably intertwined 
with the appealable arbitrability issue, see id., which, in this 
case, it is not.  We address each argument in turn.   
1. We Are Not Required to Adjudicate 
Plaintiffs’ Standing to Sue  
Uber’s first argument—that we must assure ourselves 
Plaintiffs have standing to bring their underlying claim—
returns us to the familiar terrain of Griswold.  There, as here, 
the district court concluded both that plaintiffs had Article III 
standing to sue and that they were not compelled to arbitrate 
pursuant to a contract they had never signed.3  762 F.3d at 268.  
 
3 While the district court in Griswold concluded that 
plaintiffs had standing in the course of denying the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, the District Court here stated that 
“Plaintiffs’ Article III standing [was] established” in the course 
of denying defendant Uber’s motion to compel.  For our 
purposes, this is a distinction without a difference, as Uber 





And like Uber, the appellant there argued “that [this Court has] 
not only the authority but the obligation to determine whether 
Appellees possess standing because it is a threshold 
 




To the extent it argued otherwise in its briefing, Uber 
was mistaken in any event.  Uber cited In re Majestic Star 
Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013), for the proposition 
that we must assess standing to sue on appeal if “there was no 
lower-court order refusing to dismiss the case on standing 
grounds.”  Reply Br. 4.  As we indicated in Griswold, however, 
we analyzed standing to sue in Majestic Star Casino as a matter 
of pendent jurisdiction, i.e., because “the standing issue . . . 
was inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case.”  
Griswold, 762 F.3d at 269 (citing Majestic Star Casino, 716 
F.3d at 749).  Thus, although we noted that “the standing issue 
[in Majestic Star Casino] was raised for the first time on 
appeal,” id., our point was not that we could review standing 
on interlocutory appeal because there was no order denying a 
motion to dismiss; it was that we would review standing where 
there was pendent appellate jurisdiction “even though the issue 
was not addressed before,” Majestic Star Casino, 716 F.3d at 
748—reaffirming the principle that as a “court of review, not 
of first view,” Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) 
(citation omitted), we will analyze a legal issue without the 
district court’s having done so first only in extraordinary 
circumstances.  Regardless, in this case, the issue was raised 
before the District Court and, as Uber acknowledged at 




jurisdictional requirement both in the district court and on 
appeal.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
We rejected that argument, cautioning that “although 
standing is always a threshold issue, standing to appeal should 
not be confused with standing to sue.”  Id. at 269.  Otherwise, 
we recognized, challenges to standing would blow a gaping 
hole in the final decision rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with 
defendants reflexively taking interlocutory appeals in the 
“countless cases where a district court rejected a defendant’s 
challenge to the plaintiff’s standing.”  Id. (quoting Petroleos 
Mexicanos Refinacion v. M/T King A (Ex-Tbilisi), 377 F.3d 
329, 335 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Instead, we concluded, where “a 
district court has [already] determined that a plaintiff has 
standing to sue, our power to adjudicate [the standing-to-sue] 
issue on an interlocutory basis is limited” to pendent appellate 
jurisdiction.  Id. 
Griswold’s logic is well grounded in Supreme Court 
precedent and applies to this case with full force.  The 
distinction it drew between standing to appeal and standing to 
sue comports with the mandate that the standing analysis be 
tailored to the “type of relief sought.”  Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).  And in the context of an 
interlocutory appeal under the FAA, that means we look not to 
the plaintiff and the relief sought in the underlying action, but 
to “[the] litigant who asks for . . . immediate appeal”  and “the 
category of order appealed from.”  Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 628 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted); see Raytheon Co. v. Ashborn Agencies, 
Ltd., 372 F.3d 451, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  To the extent we 
may “look through” to the “underlying substantive 




whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal 
law.”  Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009).  In 
short, what Griswold and these cases teach is that on 
interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration, we must assure ourselves of jurisdiction in two, and 
only two, respects: (1) that the appellant has standing to appeal, 
see id.; Griswold, 762 F.3d at 268, and (2) that, “save for [the 
arbitration] agreement,” the district court “would have 
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action . . . of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the 
parties,” 9 U.S.C. § 4.   
Both requirements are met here.  First, by petitioning 
for review under Section 4 of the FAA, Uber necessarily 
alleged that it was “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, 
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written 
agreement for arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. § 4.  It alleged, in other 
words, standing to appeal: that it “suffered an injury in fact” 
that was “caused by” Plaintiffs, Thole v. U. S. Bank N.A., 140 
S. Ct. 1615, 1618 (2020), and that—because the FAA allows 
Uber to appeal “an order . . . denying a petition under section 
4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,” 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(B)—that injury is one that “would likely be 
redressed by the requested judicial relief,” Thole, 140 S. Ct. at 
1618.  And second, because Plaintiffs’ ADA claim against 
Uber presents a federal question, it is undoubtedly a 
“controversy between the parties” over which, “save for [the 
alleged arbitration] agreement,” 9 U.S.C. § 4, the District 
Court would have subject matter jurisdiction under title 28.  
See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62.  As a result, we have jurisdiction 
over this appeal, and in view of our “limited” authority “to 




Griswold, 762 F.3d at 269, we have neither the need nor the 
obligation to ascertain Plaintiffs’ standing to sue.  
 Uber counters that this case is controlled by Larsen v. 
Senate, 152 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 1998), which requires us to 
resolve all jurisdictional questions on interlocutory appeal, and 
that, because Griswold was decided later, we are “bound by the 
holding in [Larsen] regardless of any conflicting language [in 
Griswold], if there is any.”  Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate 
Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2008).  The principle Uber 
invokes from Pardini, however, is applicable only where a 
subsequent panel addresses “the same issue” as the former.  Id.  
Where there is “substantial doubt as to whether a prior panel 
actually decided an issue,” on the other hand, “the later panel 
should not be foreclosed.”  Id. at 427 (citation omitted).   
Such is the case here.  In Larsen, a former 
Commonwealth justice challenged his impeachment and 
removal from office.  Although the district court concluded the 
suit did not raise political questions and was justiciable, it 
dismissed most of the claims, holding, among other things, that 
any property interest in the judicial position was too “highly 
circumscribed,” Larsen, 152 F.3d at 245 (citation omitted)—a 
question it then certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b), see id.  We determined, however, that before 
addressing the justice’s property interest in his position, we had 
to consider whether any federal review was barred by 
federalism concerns or the political-question doctrine because 
justiciability was “not only an issue that we [could] reach, but 
one that we must reach.”  Id.  Though justiciability is not a 
jurisdictional requirement, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
198 (1962), we reasoned that the Supreme Court’s instructions 




merits,” Larsen, 152 F.3d at 245 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)), extended to the 
federalism and political question issues presented.   
In urging that Larsen involved “the same issue,” 
Pardini, 524 F.3d at 426, as Griswold and requires any and all 
jurisdictional issues to be adjudicated on interlocutory appeal, 
Uber fails to acknowledge the context-specific inquiry for 
standing, see Summers, 555 U.S. at 493; Arthur Andersen, 556 
U.S. at 628.  Larsen arose in the context of a question that was 
certified under § 1292(b) and that we could not address on the 
merits without first determining that the subject matter 
belonged in federal court.  Here, as in Griswold, however, no 
justiciability hurdles stand in the way of reaching the merits of 
the arbitrability issue:  Uber has standing to appeal the denial 
of its motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(B), and there is no dispute that the District Court 
had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  In 
view of the different “type of relief sought,” Summers, 555 
U.S. at 493, and the different “category of order appealed 
from,” Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 628, Larsen does not 
control here because it neither addresses the “same issue” as 
Griswold nor contains “any conflicting language,” Pardini, 
524 F.3d at 426.  Griswold, on the other hand, is on all fours.    
In sum, having assured ourselves of appellate 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of Uber’s 
motion to compel arbitration, we have no independent duty to 
also review its ruling that Plaintiffs have standing to sue.  See 
Griswold, 762 F.3d at 269.  We turn, then, to consider whether 
the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction provides an 




2. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Is Also 
Lacking 
We have discretion to review an otherwise 
nonappealable issue under our pendent appellate jurisdiction 
where (1) it is “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable 
issue or (2) review is otherwise “necessary to ensure 
meaningful review of the appealable order.”  DuPont, 269 F.3d 
at 203.  We have cautioned, however, that this authority is 
“narrow . . . and should be used sparingly,” id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), because overuse would 
“effectively undermine the final decision rule,” Kershner v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).  
Here, Uber focuses on the first prong and argues that standing 
to sue is “inextricably intertwined” with arbitrability.  We are 
not persuaded.   
Issues are inextricably intertwined where the appealable 
issue “cannot be resolved without reference to the otherwise 
unappealable issue,” Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 
75, 88 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)—for example, if “the 
latter issue directly controls disposition of the former,” 
Kershner, 670 F.2d at 449.  It is not enough, however, for the 
two issues to merely “arise out of the same factual matrix.”  
Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 130 (3d Cir. 2018).  
If “we are confronted with two similar, but independent, 
issues,” there is no need for pendent appellate jurisdiction so 
long as “resolution of the non-appealable order would require 
us to conduct an inquiry that is distinct from . . . the inquiry 
required to resolve solely the [appealable] issue.”  Id. (quoting 
Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 553–54 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted)).  Simply put, if we can adjudicate the 




nonreviewable matters, we have no need—and therefore no 
power—to examine” those matters.  Id. at 131 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 Such was the case in Griswold, which involved the 
same nonappealable issue of standing and appealable issue of 
arbitrability, but the facts necessary for determining standing 
were different from the facts necessary to decide whether, 
under the equitable-estoppel doctrine, “a non-signatory to 
the . . . agreement . . . can be bound to its arbitration clause 
because it reaped the benefits of the contract.”  762 F.3d at 270.  
Because “the factual underpinnings of the [two] issues [we]re 
distinct,” id., we declined to exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction.   
And such is the case here, where the facts necessary to 
evaluate whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated standing under 
the ADA are different from the facts necessary for assessing 
whether they are bound by Uber’s Terms of Use.  Uber likens 
this case to In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, where we 
analyzed standing to sue after concluding that we could not 
“address the merits” of the appeal without also assessing 
“whether the Debtors ha[d] standing.”  716 F.3d 736, 747 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Here, however, the only link Uber has established 
between the issues of injury-in-fact under the ADA and 
arbitrability under the FAA is its own theory that both arise 
from its Terms of Use.  That does not mean, however, that the 
question whether Plaintiffs are equitably estopped from 
rejecting the arbitration clause “cannot be resolved without 
reference to” Plaintiffs’ standing to claim discrimination.  




intertwined, so we will not review standing to sue under our 
pendent appellate jurisdiction.4  See DuPont, 269 F.3d at 203.   
B. Equitable Estoppel Does Not Bind Plaintiffs to 
Arbitrate  
We turn finally to Uber’s motion to compel arbitration 
under Section 4 of the FAA.5  While the FAA “creates 
substantive federal law regarding the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements, requiring courts to place such 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts,” Arthur 
Andersen, 556 U.S. at 630 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted), it does not “alter background principles of 
state contract law regarding the scope of agreements,” id.  
Those background principles include “doctrines [like estoppel] 
that authorize the enforcement of a contract [against] a 
nonsignatory.”  GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, 
Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 
1643 (2020); see also Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 
F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004); 21 Williston on Contracts § 57:19 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2001).   
Here, the parties agree that the relevant state contract 
law is that of Pennsylvania.  Under Pennsylvania law, the 
 
4  As we lack jurisdiction to address it on interlocutory 
appeal, we do not opine at this juncture on the issue of 
Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their ADA claims. 
 
5 We review de novo the District Court’s decision that 
the arbitration agreement did not bind Plaintiffs as nonparties 
and, like the District Court, draw all reasonable inferences in 




general rule is that “only parties to an arbitration agreement are 
subject to arbitration,” Smay v. E.R. Stuebner, Inc., 864 A.2d 
1266, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), but in some situations, 
“equitable estoppel [may] bind non-signatories to an 
arbitration clause when the non-signatory knowingly exploits 
the agreement containing the arbitration clause despite having 
never signed the agreement,” Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, 
Inc., 121 A.3d 1008, 1015 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing 
DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199).  Put differently, where a non-
signatory “embraces the agreement and directly benefits from 
it,”  Bouriez, 359 F.3d at 295, it may not “then turn[] its back 
on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, 
that it finds distasteful,” DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200.  See 
generally Griswold, 762 F.3d at 272 n.6 (observing that 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur 
Andersen, “we may rely on our prior decisions so long as they 
do not conflict with . . . Pennsylvania state law principles”).   
On the other hand, equitable estoppel is inapposite 
where “there is no evidence that the [nonparties] availed 
[themselves] of the . . . agreement or received any benefit 
under that agreement.”  Washburn, 121 A.3d at 1015.  Where 
enforcement is sought against non-signatories, “[a] dispute that 
arises under one agreement may be litigated notwithstanding a 
mandatory arbitration clause in a second agreement,” even 
where the dispute implicates “two agreements [that] are closely 
intertwined.”6  Bouriez, 359 F.3d at 295 (citation omitted).   
 
6 This standard is distinct from that governing 





 Applying this precedent, we agree with the District 
Court that Uber’s equitable-estoppel argument is meritless.  
Aside from its unreviewable standing-related arguments, Uber 
argues only that “to prove the discrimination they allege, 
Plaintiffs must prove what Uber offers,” which they cannot do 
“without the Terms of Use because Uber makes its services 
available only because of, and pursuant to, the Terms of Use.”  
Appellant’s Br. 41.  But that strained argument is belied by the 
complaint, which describes Uber’s “on-demand transportation 
service” without any reference to the Terms of Use, A44 
(capitalization altered), and alleges that Plaintiffs have not 
downloaded Uber’s app, used its service, or otherwise availed 
themselves of any aspect of Uber’s service agreement.  Indeed, 
the crux of their claim is that Uber’s unlawful discrimination 
has prevented them from partaking in or benefiting from that 
service agreement in the first place.  Thus, as the Ninth Circuit 
put it in rejecting Uber’s estoppel argument in a companion 
case, where “[p]laintiffs do not rely on Uber’s Terms and 
Conditions,” “[n]one of [those terms] is mentioned in the . . . 
complaint, and the only [term] Uber has mentioned is the 
arbitration clause,” it’s apparent that “Plaintiffs’ case arises 
entirely under the ADA.”  Namisnak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 971 
F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2020).   
 
against a signatory.  There, the question is whether “there is an 
obvious and close nexus between the non-signatories and the 
contract or the contracting parties,” Elwyn v. DeLuca, 48 A.3d 
457, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), often measured in terms of 
“inextricabl[e] entwine[ment]” of the claims with the contract, 
id.  We have previously emphasized the importance of this 




 In sum, because there is no evidence that Plaintiffs 
“availed [themselves]” of Uber’s service agreement prior to or 
in the course of litigation or “received any benefit under that 
agreement,” Washburn, 121 A.3d at 1015, they are not 
equitably estopped from rejecting its arbitration clause.   
IV. Conclusion  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration.     
